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What Makes Negotiators Happy?
The Differential Effects of Internal and External Social Comparisons on
Negotiator Satisfaction

Abstract
This article examines the role of internal and external social comparisons in negotiator
satisfaction. Internal comparisons involve another party to the negotiation (e.g. buyer
compared to seller), while external comparisons focus on someone outside of the
negotiation (e.g. buyer compared to other buyers). Negotiator satisfaction can influence a
range of post-negotiation behavior, but relatively little is known about what makes
negotiators more or less satisfied. In many contexts negotiators receive little objective
feedback and lack benchmarks against which to judge their outcome. Prior work has
modeled negotiator satisfaction as a function of utility maximization, expectancy
disconfirmation and internal social comparisons (social utility). In this article we identify
another particularly important driver of negotiator satisfaction, external social
comparisons. Across five studies we demonstrate that external social comparisons affect
satisfaction and that the effects of external social comparisons are qualitatively different
from those of internal social comparisons. In particular, we find that downward external
social comparisons increase satisfaction, while downward internal social comparisons
decrease satisfaction. These results inform important prescriptions, and we discuss
implications of these results for managing negotiator satisfaction.

Key Words: Negotiation, Satisfaction, Social Comparison

3
While some goods and services are exchanged in transparent markets at fixed market
clearing prices, many other exchanges are characterized by a zone of indeterminacy
(Rees, 1993) and involve negotiations. In these latter cases, people may have a poor sense
of how good their outcome actually was (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996). Despite
this uncertainty, negotiators assess their satisfaction with a negotiated outcome, and these
satisfaction judgments have important implications for future behavior. For example,
dissatisfied negotiators may be less likely to follow through on an agreement and less
likely to negotiate with the same counterpart in the future (Barry & Oliver, 1996).
In this article we investigate the satisfaction process, and conceptualize negotiator
satisfaction as a labile and manipulable construct. While prior work has identified a
number of important determinants of negotiator satisfaction, we identify an important
omission in this literature. Prior work has identified self-interested utility maximization
(e.g., how low was the price I paid for the car), expectancy disconfirmation (e.g., how
does the price I paid compare to the amount I expected to pay), and internal social
comparisons (or social utility; e.g., how does the surplus I earned from this deal compare
to the amount of surplus the seller earned from the deal) as important determinants of
negotiator satisfaction. In this article we examine the role of external social comparisons
(e.g. how does the price I paid compare to the price others in a similar situation paid) in
satisfaction judgments. We demonstrate that external social comparisons significantly
influence negotiator satisfaction, and that external social comparisons have independent
and qualitatively different effects on satisfaction from internal social comparisons.
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Negotiator Satisfaction
While prior work has found that negotiators tend to be more satisfied when they
earn higher outcomes (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000), negotiators often have
difficulty evaluating their outcome. In many cases objective measures do not exist, and
disputants lack information to guide their evaluation process (Hsee, 1996). Instead,
negotiator satisfaction is likely to be heavily influenced by psychological factors.
Prior research has largely focused on two psychological determinants of
satisfaction—expectancy disconfirmation and internal social comparisons. Oliver,
Balakrishnan and Barry (1994) formalize an expectancy disconfirmation model of
negotiator satisfaction. In their model, negotiators develop expectations prior to a
negotiation and evaluate their outcome relative to these expectations. Consistent with
their model, Oliver et al. (1994) find that the difference between negotiators’ expectations
and outcomes is significantly correlated with negotiator satisfaction. These results are
consistent with Conlon and Ross’ (1993) findings in a series of mediation studies. They
find that negotiators who set lower expectations are more satisfied with their outcomes.
In many cases, however, the link between expectations and satisfaction is likely to be
complicated. Negotiators’ expectations shift during the negotiation process (Brett,
Northcraft, & Pinkley, 1999), and negotiator expectations themselves can influence
outcomes (White & Neale, 1994).
A second stream of satisfaction research involves internal social comparisons and
considers the importance of evaluating one’s outcome relative to one’s counterpart’s
outcome. Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman (1989) refer to this construct as social
utility, and they develop a model to predict satisfaction in a bargaining context. Across
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three experiments they find support for their model that includes terms for the difference
between one’s own outcome and one’s counterpart’s outcome.
Internal versus External Social Comparison
In this work we consider a different type of social comparison, external social
comparison. External social comparisons are particularly important in situations that lack
objective standards (Festinger, 1954), and consequently, we expect external social
comparison judgments to play an important role in negotiator satisfaction.
In contrast to Loewenstein et al.’s (1989) focus on comparisons with others in the
same negotiation, we consider the influence of comparisons with others outside of the
negotiation. This distinction is important for several reasons. First, internal social
comparisons and external social comparisons are conceptually distinct. These two types
of comparisons focus attention in different ways, and we expect internal and external
social comparisons to influence negotiator satisfaction very differently. Specifically,
internal social comparisons focus attention on the part of the bargaining zone that the
negotiator did not claim. While this focus alone may lower satisfaction, the tendency for
negotiators to assume that they claimed most of the available surplus (Larrick & Wu,
2003) might enhance the likelihood that an internal comparison will induce
disappointment. As a result, we propose that internal social comparison values, even
those that inform a negotiator that she captured most of the bargaining zone (i.e.
downward comparisons), are likely to lower satisfaction.
The proposition that even downward internal social comparison values may lower
satisfaction is consistent with prior work that has found that negotiators tend to be less
satisfied when they believe that they could have earned higher outcomes. For example,
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Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and Medvec (2002) find that even when negotiators earned more
surplus, they were less satisfied when their counterpart immediately accepted their first
offer than when their counterpart did not immediately accept their first offer. In other
work, Naquin (2003) finds that negotiators are less satisfied when their negotiation
involves a large number of issues than when their negotiation involves a small number of
issues, because negotiators are concerned that they will miss opportunities for increasing
their surplus—a legitimate concern (Moran & Ritov, 2002; Pinkley, Griffith, and
Northcraft, 1995).
External social comparisons are less clearly related to forgone opportunities than
are internal social comparisons. Therefore, we expect upward external social comparisons
to decrease satisfaction and downward external social comparisons to increase
satisfaction.
Another difference between internal and external comparisons is that unlike
external social comparisons, internal social comparisons confound relative performance
with fairness. In fact, fairness considerations are an essential part of Loewenstein et al.’s
(1989) framework, prompting them to use scenarios with equal surplus outcomes as the
baseline case. In our studies we use the absence of comparison information as our control
condition to examine the absolute influence of introducing comparison information.
Study 1
Our first study examines the influence of external social comparison values on
negotiator satisfaction. Although prior work has identified a link between internal social
comparison cues and satisfaction in scenario studies (Loewenstein et al., 1989), we
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explore a different set of social comparison cues, external rather than internal social
comparisons, in a different context, a negotiation exercise.
In our study, participants experienced a number of factors in addition to external
social comparison cues that are likely to influence their satisfaction. For example,
participants’ satisfaction in our experiment may have been influenced by how much
participants liked each other, how high or low their expectations were, the sequence of
offers and counter-offers, persuasive arguments, and even their own affective states.
Taken together, these factors may compete with or even overwhelm the effects of
external social comparisons.
Method
A sample of 354 undergraduate and MBA students completed an in-class exercise
on the first day of class. Participants read background information regarding the sale of a
used truck. Participants were randomly paired and assigned to the role of either buyer or
seller. Buyers had private information regarding an alternative truck they could purchase
for $5500, and sellers had private information regarding an alternative buyer who would
be willing to purchase the truck for $3500. Participants bargained in pairs until they
reached an agreement, decided they could not reach an agreement, or reached the set time
limit (of 40 minutes).
After completing the exercise, groups of participants were exposed to an external
social comparison manipulation. We randomly assigned groups of approximately 20
dyads to be exposed to either a high or a low external social referent. The experimenter
asked one pair in each experimental session to reveal their final price. In the high external
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social referent condition, that pair had reached an agreement of $55001. In the low
external social referent condition, the group was exposed to an agreement of $4500.
Participants were led to believe that the experimenters had forgotten to distribute the
post-negotiation survey and had mistakenly started the debriefing. Immediately following
this manipulation, and before any further discussion of the exercise, participants
completed a survey that contained our primary dependent measures. All participants were
asked, “How satisfied are you with your outcome from this negotiation?” and “How
satisfied are you with the negotiation process?” Each question was asked with an 11point scale ranging from extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied. Then as a
manipulation check, they judged how well their outcome compares to outcomes of others
in the same role. Buyers were asked how their outcome compares to other buyers’
outcomes and sellers were asked to compare their outcome to other sellers. The 11-point
response scale ranged from worst in the class to best in the class.
Results
A total of 316 participants reached an agreement within the allotted time and
completed all dependent measures. Final prices ranged from $3500 to $5500 with a mean
of $4746 and a standard deviation of $508. Outcome and process satisfaction were highly
correlated (r = .62 for buyers, p <. 001; r = .64 for sellers, p < .001) and separate analyses
of outcome satisfaction and process satisfaction produced similar patterns of results. In
the analyses that follow, we used an overall measure of satisfaction: the sum of outcome
and process satisfaction.

1

Since one experimental session did not include a dyad who reached an agreement at $5500, we used an
agreement of $5250 in that session.
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As depicted in Figure 1, our external social comparison cues significantly
influenced social comparison judgments. Buyers exposed to the high external social
referent judged that they had performed relatively better than buyers exposed to the low
external social referent, (µ = 5.6 versus µ = 4.8, t (151) = 3.37, p < .001). As expected,
this pattern was reversed for sellers. Sellers exposed to the low external social referent
thought they had performed relatively better than sellers exposed to the high external
social referent, (µ = 5.9 versus µ = 4.9, t (145) = 3.97, p < .001).
More importantly, the external social comparison manipulation influenced
participants’ satisfaction (see Figure 2). As expected, buyers in the high external social
referent condition were more satisfied than buyers in the low external social referent
condition, (µ = 12.9 versus µ = 11.8, t (152) = 1.89, p < .05), and sellers in the low
external social referent condition were more satisfied than sellers in the high external
social referent condition, (µ = 12.9 versus µ = 11.8, t (145) = 1.95, p < .05).
Discussion
These results identify a causal link between external social comparison cues and
satisfaction. Incidental social comparison cues had a dramatic effect on satisfaction
despite all the other information available in the negotiation context. Like car buyers in a
dealership, participants in our experiment had a prolonged interaction including
discussion, an exchange of offers, and both verbal and non-verbal reactions to each
other’s offers. All of these cues could have affected their negotiation satisfaction. Even
with these competing cues, however, we find that external social comparison values have
a substantial effect on satisfaction. In practice, a number of factors are likely to moderate
the relationship between external social comparison cues and satisfaction. For example,
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Goethals and Darley (1977) suggest that social comparison effects can be moderated by
the relationship between the referent and the perceiver, the relative status of the referent
and the perceived competency the referent.
Study 2
In our second study we examine the influence of external social comparison
information relative to other determinants of satisfaction. Unlike Study 1, we do not
focus participants’ attention on external social comparison cues. Instead, we examine the
influence of self-constructed external and internal social comparisons on negotiator
satisfaction. Unlike previous experimental studies of social comparison in negotiations,
our design enables us to assess the relative contribution of different drivers of satisfaction
in a more natural context where attention is not artificially drawn to social comparisons.
To assess the relative influence of different drivers of satisfaction we compare
four alternative models of negotiator satisfaction. We derive the first three models from
prior research: an objective utility model, a social utility model, and an expectancy
disconfirmation model. We develop the fourth model to represent the role of external
social comparison judgments in satisfaction.
Method
A total of 188 graduate and undergraduate business students participated in a
bargaining exercise on the first day of a negotiation class. They participated in the same
bargaining exercise used in Study 1. After participants read their background
information, but before they bargained, participants were asked to predict the price they
were most likely to agree on with their partner (Oliver, Balakrishnan, and Barry, 1994).
Participants then bargained in pairs until they reached an agreement, decided they could
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not reach an agreement, or reached the set time limit (of 40 minutes). After the
bargaining session all participants responded to a post-bargaining questionnaire. This
questionnaire asked participants to judge their satisfaction with their outcome (from
extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied), their satisfaction with the bargaining
process (using the same satisfaction scale as the one we used in Study 1), and how well
they thought their outcome compared to other participants in their same role (from much
better than others to much worse than others). They were also asked to estimate their
partner’s reservation price. Sellers were asked to estimate the highest price their buyer
would pay and buyers were asked to estimate the lowest price their seller would accept.
Results
A total of 156 participants reached an agreement and completed all dependent
measures. Final prices ranged from $3600 to $5800, with a mean of $4850 and standard
deviation of $516. As in Study 1, we summed outcome and process satisfaction (r = .48
for buyers, p <. 001; r = .62 for sellers, p < .001) to produce one overall measure of
satisfaction.
In this study we focus on the effects of objective outcomes, social utility,
expectancy disconfirmation, and external social comparison on satisfaction. Consistent
with this approach we develop and compare four alternative models of satisfaction. To
help gauge the performance of these models, we introduce a combined model that
includes all the factors used in the four models of interest. We describe each of these
models in turn.
Objective Utility Model. We derive the first model from classical economics
which posits a relationship between the objective measure of price and satisfaction. We
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include a quadratic term in our model to allow for diminishing marginal utility. The
objective utility model is represented in Equation 1.
SatisfactionOU = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2
+ constant

(1)

Social Utility Model. The second model draws on the work of Loewenstein et al.
(1989). They find that satisfaction is a function not only of how much money an
individual receives, but also of how much money one’s counterpart receives. In our
framework these are internal comparisons, and we refer to the class of models that use
internal comparisons to predict satisfaction as social utility models. Loewenstein et al.
(1989) investigate a business negotiation context similar to our negotiation context. In
that setting they find that a model that includes both linear and quadratic terms for one’s
own outcome and for one’s partner’s outcome offers the best fit for predicting
satisfaction.
In the Loewenstein et al. (1989) studies, participants were told how much they
and their hypothetical partners received beyond their respective reservation prices. In the
present study, participants actually negotiated with a partner and were not told their
partner’s reservation price. This mimics many actual negotiations where negotiators are
never told their partner’s reservation price. As a result, participants in this study cannot
directly compute their counterpart’s surplus. Instead, we asked participants to estimate
their counterpart’s reservation price, and subtracted this value from the final price to
compute perceived partner’s surplus. Our social utility model is depicted in Equation 2.
(2)

SatisfactionSU = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2
+ β3 (perceived partner’s surplus) + β4 (perceived partner’s surplus)2
+ constant
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Expectancy Disconfirmation Model. We borrow the expectancy disconfirmation
model from research conducted by Oliver et al. (1994). They find that satisfaction with
negotiated outcomes is a function of an individual’s profit and of the difference between
one’s actual outcome and one’s expected outcome. In the present study, each participant
was asked to predict the most likely outcome of the negotiation before the bargaining
session began. We use the difference between this prediction and the actual outcome to
measure expectancy disconfirmation (see equation 3).
SatisfactionED = β1 (objective outcome)
+ β2 (expectancy disconfirmation)
+ constant

(3)

External Social Comparison Model. We measure external social comparison with
a question asking participants how well they think their outcome compares to the
outcomes of others in their same role. This measure is the only predictor used in the
external social comparison model. This model is represented in Equation 4.
SatisfactionSC = β1 (social comparison)
+ constant

(4)

Combined Model. This model, depicted in Equation 5, includes all predictors
from the four models above. It provides a benchmark to evaluate the performance of our
four models.
(5)

Satisfaction = β1 (objective outcome) + β2 (objective outcome)2
+ β3 (partner’s surplus) + β4 (partner’s surplus)2
+ β5 (expectancy disconfirmation)
+ β6 (social comparison)
+ constant
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We fit each model separately for buyers and sellers, and report the results in Table
1. As expected, several models explain statistically significant amounts of variance in
satisfaction, and we describe results from each of these models in turn. The first model in
Table 1 is the objective utility model. Consistent with increasing utility and declining
marginal utility, for both buyers and sellers the parameter estimates for objective
outcome were positive, and the parameter estimates for the quadratic term were negative.
The utility parameters, however, were not significant for either buyers or sellers2, and
overall, the objective utility model was significant for sellers, but not for buyers. The
variance accounted for by the objective utility model was significantly less than the
combined model (F (4,63) = 5.34, p < .001 for buyers; F (4,67) = 3.64, p < .01 for
sellers).
The second model in Table 1 is the social utility model. As expected, the
parameter estimates for partner’s outcome were negative for both buyers and sellers. The
higher a counterpart’s perceived surplus, the less satisfied participants were. This result
was statistically significant for sellers, but not buyers. For sellers, we also found
diminishing marginal disutility for larger partner outcomes. Overall, the social utility
model accounted for a statistically significant portion of satisfaction variance for sellers,
but not buyers. The social utility model for sellers captured marginally less variance than
the combined model (F (2,67) = 3.05, p = .054). The social utility model for buyers
captured significantly less variance than the combined model (F (2,63) = 8.35, p < .001).
The third model shown in Table 1 is the expectancy disconfirmation model. This
model identifies a positive relationship between expectancy disconfirmation and

2

For sellers’ satisfaction, the linear term becomes significant if the quadratic term is removed, suggesting
that there is some reliable linear effect of objective outcome.

15
satisfaction. The more participants’ outcomes exceeded their expectations, the more
satisfied they were. This relationship was significant for buyers, but not for sellers. The
expectancy disconfirmation model for both buyers and sellers accounted for significantly
less variance than the combined model (F (4,63) = 3.60, p < .05 for buyers; F (4,67) =
3.64, p < .01 for sellers).
For both buyers and sellers the external social comparison parameters were in the
predicted direction and statistically significant. Both groups were more satisfied the better
they thought their outcome compared to the outcomes of others in their same role. In
addition, these models explained a high proportion of variance in satisfaction. In fact, the
variance captured by the social comparison model was not significantly different from the
variance captured by the combined model for buyers (F (5,63) < 1) or sellers (F (5,67) =
1.35, ns).
Looking at the coefficient estimates for the combined model, we see that the
external social comparison variables remain highly significant predictors of satisfaction
controlling for factors identified in previous research. In fact, this is the only parameter
that is statistically significant for both buyers and sellers in the combined model.
Discussion
Results from this study suggest that external social comparison is a key
determinant of negotiator satisfaction. In fact, in this study once external social
comparison values were included in the model, other factors, such as expectations, social
utility, and even the agreed price, accounted for very little of the variance in satisfaction.
Both buyers and sellers were more satisfied when they thought that others in their
position had received less than they had. It is important to note that in this study
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participants were not provided with information about how well others had actually
performed. As a result, participants in this study constructed social comparisons in the
absence of any immediately available comparison information (e.g. Suls, Marco, and
Tobin 1991; Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman 1985), so our findings may offer a
conservative test of the importance of external social comparison. If participants had
received information about others’ outcomes, the social comparison model may have
accounted for an even larger proportion of the variance.
Our results also provide some support for the social utility (Loewenstein et al.
1989) and expectancy disconfirmation (Oliver et al. 1994) accounts of satisfaction.
Consistent with the social utility prediction, sellers were more satisfied when they
perceived that their counterpart earned less surplus. Supporting the expectancy
disconfirmation account, we found that buyers were more satisfied when the final price
they actually agreed to was low compared to the price they expected to pay ex-ante. For
both buyers and sellers, however, social comparison judgments were the most reliable
predictor of satisfaction.
Surprisingly, the objective outcome model captured little variance, particularly for
buyers. That is, buyers’ and sellers’ satisfaction did not vary much with changes in the
agreed price. Although economic theory suggests that objective prices should dominate
uninformed social comparisons, we find the reverse pattern of effects. Our results may be
better understood by considering the notion of evaluability introduced by Hsee (1996).
Some information (e.g. prices) can be difficult to evaluate in some contexts and easy to
evaluate in other contexts. In this experiment, price information may have been difficult
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to evaluate. In Study 5, we examine social comparison effects while manipulating the
evaluability of the negotiated price.
Study 3
In study three we extend our investigation to examine the mechanics of external
social comparisons. In this study we manipulate both internal and external social
comparison values, and we measure the individual and joint effects of internal and
external social comparison cues. This aspect of our design enables us to test the
hypothesis that downward external social comparison values increase negotiator
satisfaction more than downward internal social comparison values.
In this study we also examine the absolute effect of social comparison cues by
comparing to a condition with no social comparison information. This aspect of our
design is different from prior work (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 1989), and results from this
study can inform the basic decision of whether or not to reveal social comparison
information.
Method
A total of 265 respondents from a large Northeast train station read and answered
questions about a scenario that described the purchase of a rare coin. Each respondent
read one of nine versions from a 3 (external social comparison: high, low or none) x 3
(internal social comparison: high, low, or none) factorial design. Across all versions,
participants were informed that they purchased the coin for $80 and that they would have
paid any amount up to $110. That is, across all versions participants earned a surplus of
$30. We manipulated external social comparisons by mentioning a friend who had either
paid more or less than they had for a similar coin. The friend’s surplus was either $10,
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$50 or unspecified. We manipulated internal social comparisons by providing
information about the lowest price for which the seller would have been willing to sell
the coin. Across conditions, the seller’s surplus was either $10, $50, or unspecified.
Each respondent saw only one version of the scenario, shown below.
Imagine that after traveling with a good friend last summer, you both developed
an interest in old coins. You purchased a couple of old coins during your trip, and you
are interested in expanding your small collection.
One day, you happen to walk by a local antique show. While looking through a
few items, you come across a table with old coins. The seller recently inherited the coins,
and he is hoping to make some money. One of the coins catches your eye. It is an old
American coin in excellent condition. You decide to purchase the coin if you can get it for
any amount below $110. You start to bargain with the seller, and after a few minutes you
agree to pay $80. [You find out after you make your purchase that the seller would have
sold the coin for any amount over $70/$30.]
As you continue walking through the antique show you happen to run into your
friend. You begin to tell your friend about your recent purchase, and it turns out he had
also just bought an old coin, from a different seller. You compare the two coins and find
that they are very similar. In fact, both coins have the same design, are the same age and
both are in excellent condition. [Your friend paid $100/$60 for his coin.]
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked how satisfied they would be
with their purchase on a 9-point scale ranging from “not at all satisfied” to “extremely
satisfied.” They were then asked to estimate the value (in dollars) of the coin.
Results
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In an ANOVA model predicting satisfaction, we found significant main effects
for both internal (F(2, 256) =30.7, p < .001) and external social comparison values (F(2,
256) = 21.0, p < .001), and a significant interaction (F(4, 256) = 4.89, p < .001). As
depicted in Table 2, internal and external social comparisons had very different effects on
satisfaction. For internal social comparisons, both upward and downward internal social
comparisons decreased satisfaction (Ms = 3.10 and 4.73, respectively) relative to no
internal social comparison information (M = 5.68, t (56) = 4.88, p < .001, t(56) = 1.77,
p=.083). For external comparisons, however, the pattern is very different. Upward
external comparisons reduced satisfaction (4.41 versus 5.68, t(55) = 2.40, p < .05), but
downward external comparison information markedly increased satisfaction (7.31 versus
5.68, t(55) = 3.23, p < .005). Upward comparisons with an external referent produced
significantly higher satisfaction than upward comparisons with an internal referent ( 7.31
versus 4.73, t(57) = 5.63, p < .001).
We also find an interesting interaction between internal and external social
comparisons. External social comparisons influenced satisfaction more when the internal
social comparison was downward (6.63 vs. 4.17) than when the internal social
comparison was upward (3.83 vs. 3.80). Similarly, internal social comparisons influenced
satisfaction more when the external social comparison was downward (6.63 vs. 3.83)
than when the external social comparison was upward (4.73 vs. 3.80). It seems that one
unfavorable comparison dampens the effect of any other comparison.
Importantly, we find different effects for downward internal and external social
comparisons. Downward external comparisons increased satisfaction, while downward
internal comparisons decreased satisfaction. One possible explanation for this asymmetric
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effect is that internal and external social comparisons influence perceptions of value
differently. After all, by construction, the lowest price at which the seller would sell is
lower than the price the buyer paid, while the price a friend paid could be higher or lower
than the price paid by the buyer.
To test whether the social comparison effects we observe in this study influence
satisfaction by simply changing perceptions of value, we added perceived value as a
covariate in our ANOVA. In this model we find that perceived value is a significant
predictor of satisfaction (F (2, 255) = 111, p < .001), but the main effects and interaction
of social comparisons remain significant (Fs > 5, ps < .005). To test for the effects of
social comparison beyond influencing perceptions of value, we ran a regression
predicting satisfaction from perceived value and four dummy variables corresponding to
the effects of upward and downward internal and external social comparisons. We find
that the same social comparison effects remain significant after controlling for perceived
value: upward and downward internal comparisons lower satisfaction, upward external
comparisons lower satisfaction, and downward external comparisons raise satisfaction.
Discussion
In this study, we manipulated both types of social comparisons, and we find that
both significantly influence negotiator satisfaction. When we control for changes in
perceptions of value, we still find significant effects of internal and external social
comparisons on satisfaction.
Results from this study also reveal qualitative differences between internal and
external social comparisons. The key difference between internal and external social
comparison values is in the effect of downward comparison values. Compared to a base-
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line case of no social comparison information, we find that downward external social
comparison cues increase satisfaction, while downward internal comparison cues
decrease satisfaction.
Before running this study, we were not sure whether negotiators would be more or
less satisfied upon learning that they had come close to their participant’s reservation
price. One might imagine several possible reactions to downward internal comparisons:
(1) satisfaction with claiming most of the total surplus (i.e., I am glad I got so close to my
partner’s reservation price), (2) dissatisfaction with advantageous inequity (i.e., I feel
badly that my partner did not earn as much as I did), or (3) dissatisfaction upon learning
of forgone opportunities to claim additional surplus (i.e., I wish I had gotten even closer
to my partner’s reservation price). Results from Study 3 are consistent with the second
and third reactions, but are not consistent with the first. In our next study we test whether
the second or the third reaction is responsible for dissatisfaction following downward
internal social comparisons.
Study 4
In Study 3 we demonstrate an important asymmetry between the effects of
internal and external social comparisons. In this study we explore this asymmetry and
investigate two possible mechanisms for this effect. First, we consider the possibility that
downward internal social comparisons harm satisfaction because they generate feelings
of inequality (Loewenstein et al. 1989). That is, negotiators exposed to downward
internal social comparison cues may be dissatisfied because they value equality and
dislike unequal outcomes. If this is true, negotiator satisfaction should be greater when a
counterpart’s surplus is higher and closer to one’s own outcome.
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Alternatively, negotiators may be dissatisfied by downward internal social
comparisons because any mention of their partner’s surplus raises the prospect that they
could have earned even more surplus for themselves. If this is true, then satisfaction
should decrease as one’s counterpart’s surplus is closer to one’s own outcome.
Method
We recruited 155 undergraduate students from a Northeastern university to
complete one of six versions of a survey. We modified the materials used in Study 3 to
create six versions in a 2 (External social comparison: Downward or No information) x 3
(Internal social comparison: Equal, Small surplus, or No surplus) design. As in Study 3,
across all versions participants earned a surplus of $30. We manipulated external social
comparisons by mentioning a friend who had either paid more than they had ($10
surplus) or by providing no information about the friend’s purchase price. We
manipulated internal social comparisons by providing information about the price for
which the seller would have been willing to sell the coin. Across conditions, the seller’s
surplus was either $30 (Equal condition), $10 (Small surplus), or $0 (No surplus).
Each respondent saw only one version of the materials. After reading the scenario,
respondents were asked to indicate how satisfied they were with the purchase using the
same scale as Study 3.
Results
We analyzed satisfaction scores using a 2x3 ANOVA (see Table 3). Both main
effects were highly significant (Internal – F(2,145) = 58.4, p < .001; External – F(1,145)
= 41.0, p < .001), and there was no significant interaction (F < 1). The key result in this
study is the main effect of internal social comparison on satisfaction. As the inequality
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between the outcomes grew, satisfaction increased. Respondents were most satisfied
when their counterpart earned no surplus (M = 6.87), significantly less satisfied when
their counterpart earned a small surplus ($10; M = 6.08, t(99) = 2.51, p < .02), and even
less satisfied when their counterpart earned an equal surplus ($30; M = 3.62, t(98) = 7.26,
p < .001). Replicating results from Study 3, we find that participants were more satisfied
with a downward external comparison (M = 6.38) than with no external social
comparison information (M = 4.70).
Discussion
Results from this study do not support an equality-based explanation for the
relationship between social comparisons and satisfaction. Specifically, we find that
participants were more satisfied the greater the gap between their surplus and their
partner’s surplus. This finding suggests that downward internal social comparisons can
harm negotiator satisfaction by highlighting missed opportunities to increase one’s
surplus.
More broadly, results from this work highlight conceptual and practical
differences between internal and external social comparisons. Unlike external social
comparisons, both upward and downward internal social comparisons can decrease
negotiator satisfaction.
This work, however, does not address an important question about the practical
implications of social comparison information. In our previous studies, participants
evaluated outcomes in the absence of objective benchmarks. Social comparison
information may influence satisfaction very differently when individuals have objective
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standards with which to evaluate their outcome. We investigate this issue in our next
study.
Study 5
In our previous studies, participants’ outcomes were difficult to evaluate. In these
settings, social comparison information may have been particularly influential because
participants lacked objective benchmarks. In this study, we manipulate outcome
evaluability and we measure changes in the influence of external social comparisons on
satisfaction.
In many situations, negotiated outcomes are difficult to evaluate. For example, the
range of appropriate prices for a used car or appropriate discounts for last season’s
fashions are characterized by large zones of indeterminacy (Rees, 1993). In most cases,
objective information (e.g., the book value of a used car or information about prior
discounts) can make negotiated outcomes easier to evaluate.
Social comparisons may influence satisfaction, in part, by changing perceptions of
value. As a result, we expect social comparison information to influence satisfaction
more when the situation has low evaluability than when it has high evaluability.
However, results from Study 3 revealed that social comparison affects satisfaction above
and beyond its effects on the perceived value of the deal. Consequently, we suspect that
even in high evaluability situations, social comparison information will affect
satisfaction. In this study, we explore this proposition.
Method
A total of 202 passengers waiting at a Northeast airport were recruited to
participate in this study. We used methods similar to those we used in Studies 3 and 4.
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Participants read a scenario about the purchase of a rare coin. Each respondent saw one
version from a 2 (External social comparison: high or low) x 3 (Appraisal value: high,
low, or none) factorial design. We manipulated external social comparison by mentioning
that a friend had either paid more or less for a similar coin. We manipulated appraisal
value by mentioning that an expert appraiser had either valued the coin at more than they
had paid, valued the coin at less than they had paid, or did not appraise the coin. We
appended the following paragraph to the end of the scenario we used in our previous
studies:
Many antique shows sponsor appraisal tables. At this antique show the appraisal
table includes professional appraisers, and one of them is an expert in antique coins. You
decide to have your coin appraised by the coin specialist. [After a careful inspection, the
appraiser tells you that your coin is probably worth $120. OR After a careful inspection,
the appraiser tells you that your coin is probably worth $45. OR The line for the coin
appraiser, however, was quite long so you decided not to wait for an appraisal.]
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked how satisfied they would be
with their purchase using the same scale as the previous two studies.
Results
We analyzed satisfaction scores using a 2x3 ANOVA with social comparison and
appraisal as independent factors. Both main effects were significant (F (1,195) = 43.3, p
< .001 for external social comparison, F (2,195) = 84.1, p < .001 for appraisal).
Respondents who were informed that their friend paid less were less satisfied (µ = 3.92)
than those who were informed that their friend paid more (µ = 5.48). Respondents in the
high appraisal condition were more satisfied (µ = 6.62) than those in the no appraisal
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condition (µ = 4.67), and those in the no appraisal condition were more satisfied than
those in the low appraisal condition (µ = 2.88). Supporting our thesis, these main effects
were qualified by a significant interaction (F (2,195) = 7.40, p < .001). As depicted in
Figure 3, social comparison information had the largest effect on satisfaction when no
appraisal was given (µ = 3.31 versus µ = 5.94, t (64) = 7.00, p < .001). This effect was
significantly larger than the effect with a low appraisal (F (1,130) = 13.2, p < .001) and
significantly larger than the effect with a high appraisal (F (1,129) = 3.90, p < .05).
The high appraisal condition showed a greater effect of social comparison
information than the low appraisal condition (F (1,131) = 4.01, p < .05). Importantly, the
effect of social comparison in the high appraisal condition was significant (µ = 5.80
versus µ = 7.41, t (65) = 4.53, p < .001), while in the low appraisal condition there was
no significant effect of social comparison information (µ = 2.68 versus µ = 3.09, t < 1).
Discussion
As predicted, the influence of external social comparison information was greater
when there was no appraisal than when there was an appraisal. This result supports the
proposition that the evaluability of an outcome moderates the influence of social
comparison information on satisfaction. However, we still find that social comparison
information matters when objective information is evaluable and positive. In this case,
social comparison information influenced satisfaction despite the presence of objective
information.
We also found that social comparison information did not significantly influence
satisfaction when objective information was evaluable and negative. This result suggests
that social comparison information may depress satisfaction with a deal that is known to
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be good more easily than it can increase satisfaction with a deal that is known to be bad.
This asymmetry parallels the asymmetry found in Study 3, whereby adding information
to a situation where there is already a negative impression of the negotiated outcome had
little effect, while adding the same information when there is a positive impression has a
substantial effect.
General Discussion
In this paper we examine the influence of social comparisons on negotiator
satisfaction. We make a conceptual distinction between internal social comparisons,
comparisons made with a negotiation counterpart (e.g., a buyer comparing his surplus to
the seller’s surplus), and external social comparisons, comparisons with negotiators in
similar situations outside of one’s own negotiation (e.g., a car buyer comparing his
surplus to the surplus of another buyer purchasing a similar car). Across five studies we
demonstrate that the effects of internal and external social comparisons on satisfaction are
qualitatively different. In particular, while downward external social comparisons
increase negotiator satisfaction, similar downward internal social comparisons decrease
negotiator satisfaction. This may happen because even downward internal social
comparison values focus negotiator’s attention on missed opportunities to claim
additional surplus.
Our distinction between internal and external social comparisons also has
practical implications. First, the set of available external comparison values is typically
very different from the set of available internal comparison values. For example, a car
salesperson who has just concluded a negotiation with a buyer has a relatively
constrained set of internal social comparisons from which to choose. The seller could
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either conceal or reveal her surplus (or possibly misrepresent her surplus). With respect to
external social comparisons, however, the seller has the option of selecting from a
number of prior negotiation outcomes. In this case, the seller has a much broader set of
external social comparison alternatives than internal social comparison alternatives, and
her ability to identify a credible downward external social comparison is greater than her
ability to identify a downward internal social comparison.
Internal and external social comparisons are also very different with respect to the
type of information they convey. Specifically, unlike external social comparison values,
internal social comparison values convey information that is explicit about missed
opportunities to claim additional surplus. Consistent with our findings, this difference
suggests that internal social comparisons will be more likely to lower satisfaction than
external social comparisons.
More broadly, results from our work demonstrate that satisfaction judgments are
very labile and subject to manipulation. Both internal social comparisons and external
social comparisons are key drivers of satisfaction, and prescriptively, negotiators should
recognize that the satisfaction their counterparts derive from a negotiation may have less
to do with the actual concessions they make (e.g. objective profit) than the comparison
information they provide. In our studies we find that the effects of social comparisons on
satisfaction are not mediated by value. That is, negotiators have preferences for
outperforming others that are separate from their preference for the value of the outcome
itself.
A number of factors are likely to moderate the importance of social comparisons
on satisfaction. For example, in Study 5 we found that evaluability moderates the
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influence of social comparison information on satisfaction. Social comparison
information matters most in cases where outcomes are difficult to evaluate or objective
information is favorable. Future research should explore the effects of evaluability on
satisfaction more broadly, and consider a number of other individual and contextual
factors that are likely to moderate the influence of social comparison information on
negotiator satisfaction. For example, future work could consider the importance of a
negotiator’s relationship with his or her partner, a negotiator’s level of experience with
the particular negotiation situation, a negotiator’s emotional state, and the interplay
between social comparison information and other aspects of the negotiation process (e.g.,
Schweitzer & Kerr, 2000; Schweitzer & Gomberg, 2001).
In addition, future research should explore the selection and construction of
comparisons. In experimental studies social comparison values are often provided (e.g.,
De Dreu, Lualhati & McCusker, 1994; Messick & Sentis, 1985; Ordonez, Connolly, &
Coughlan, 2000). In many settings, however, social comparison values are generated or
selected by the negotiator. In some cases, individuals may select from multiple social
comparison values or even generate social comparison judgments in the absence of
comparison information. For example, people may develop a sense of how others would
perform and construct a social comparison judgment grounded in assumptions about their
own negotiation skill relative to others. Perhaps, in the absence of social comparison
information people tend to generate favorable social comparisons. In our studies we
included conditions of no information, and we find that in many cases negotiators were
more satisfied with no information than they were with the social comparison information
we provided. In particular, our results suggest that negotiators are often disappointed to
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learn about a counterpart’s surplus, even when their counterpart’s surplus is far smaller
than their own. It is important to note that our studies focused on the effects of social
comparison, once that information is made available. While our data provide some
insight into the effects on satisfaction of introducing social comparison information, these
results largely ignore the question of when and how people seek out this information.
Clearly, more research is needed to understand how social comparison judgments are
constructed in natural negotiation contexts.
Although the vast majority of negotiation studies focus on the negotiation process
itself (see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000), post-negotiation behaviors (e.g.,
offers to make amends; Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan, 1999) can have profound effects
on how negotiation counterparts interact with each other following a negotiation. For
example, post-negotiation actions may significantly influence a negotiators’ preferences
for repeated interactions, commitment to a deal, and willingness to cooperate in domains
not explicitly covered in an agreement (e.g., how hard an employee works following
contract negotiations). Revealing comparison information can be conceptualized as
another post negotiation behavior that individuals can use to influence their counterpart’s
future behavior. Additional work remains to develop our understanding of how social
comparisons influence both proximal and distant negotiator behavior.
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Table 1: Models of Satisfaction (Study 2)
Model Type

Model Fit

Beta Weights
(Standard Error)
Objective (Objective Partner’s (Partner’s Expectancy
Social
Outcome Outcome)2 Outcome Outcome)2 Disconfirmation Comparison

Buyers’ Models
Economic
Utility Model
Social Utility
Model
Expectancy
Disconfirmation
Model
Social
Comparison
Model
Combined
Model

Adj. R2=.007
F(2,67)=1.24
Adj. R2=.033
F(4,65)=1.59
Adj. R2=.089*
F(2,67)=4.38*

.349
(.330)
.370
(.331)
.111
(.118)

-.185
(.330)
-.177
(.330)

-.108
(.357)

-.129
(.353)
.298*
(.118)

Adj._R2=.228***
F(1,68)=21.38***
Adj. R2=.211**
F(6,63)=4.08**

.489***
(.106)
.076
(.314)

-.109
(.302)

-.030
(.327)

-.086
(.321)

.361
(.473)
.380
(.460)
.297*
(.114)

-.064
(.473)
-.140
(.462)

-.734**
(.264)

.613*
(.257)

.191
(.117)

.401**
(.134)

Sellers’ Models
Economic
Adj. R2=.064*
F(2,71)=3.49*
Utility Model
Social Utility
Adj. R2=.136**
Model
F(4,69)=3.88**
Expectancy
Adj. R2=.064*
Disconfirmation F(2,71)=3.49*
Model
Social
Adj. R2=.165***
F(1,72)=15.44***
Comparison
Model
Combined
Adj. R2=.185**
F(6,67)=3.76**
Model
*
p < .05
**
p < .01
***
p < .001

.015
(.114)
.420***
(.107)

.152
(.459)

-.003
(.451)

-.564*
(.266)

.516
(.257)

-.006
(.108)

.298*
(.122)
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Table 2: Mean Satisfaction Judgments (Study 3)
External Social
Comparison
Downward
(Smaller Surplus)
No Information
Upward
(Greater Surplus)

Downward
6.63
SD = 1.65
N = 30
4.73
SD = 1.89
N = 30
4.17
SD = 1.97
N = 30

Internal Social Comparison
No Information
7.31
SD = 1.61
N = 29
5.68
SD = 2.18
N = 28
4.41
SD = 1.78
N = 29

Satisfaction Rating (1: Not at all satisfied, 9: Extremely satisfied)

Upward
3.83
SD = 1.97
N = 29
3.10
SD = 1.85
N = 30
3.80
SD = 2.46
N = 30
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Table 3: Mean Satisfaction Judgments (Study 4)
External Social
Comparison
Downward
(Smaller Surplus)
No information

Internal Social Comparison
Equal Surplus
Smaller Surplus
4.54
6.80
SD = 1.86
SD = 1.04
N = 24
N = 25
2.77
5.36
SD = 1.77
SD = 1.15
N = 26
N = 25

Satisfaction Rating (1: Not at all satisfied, 9: Extremely satisfied)

No Surplus
7.67
SD = 1.65
N = 26
6.04
SD = 1.62
N = 25
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Judged Social Comparison

Figure 1: Social Comparison Judgment by Social Referent (Study 1)
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Figure 2: Satisfaction Judgment by Social Referent (Study 1)
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Figure 3: Satisfaction Judgments (Study 5)
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